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EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE-MORAL, ETHICAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
BRUCE VODIGA*
QUESTIONS REGARDING DEATH and dying have recently become pop-
ular topics for discussion by lawyers, physicians, theologians, philos-
ophers and the public. Is euthanasia murder? Should steps be taken
toward legalization? Is private regulation an effective method for con
trol? These questions and numerous others are being asked with in-
creasing frequency. These are urgent questions that require careful
and thorough analysis and comprehensive answers.
This article examines these questions and some of the answers
that have been developed.' Hopefully, it will provide the reader not
only with some basic reference material for more thorough evaluation
of the now "controversial" concept of human death, but also with a
frame of reference, a rational, logical and persuasive perspective from
which to consider death and dying. This, then, will not be a detailed
legal analysis, that would make it unnecessarily redundant; this will
not be a lengthy exposition, that would make it counterproductively
boring; this will merely be a brief intrusion into the mystically evasive
and deeply personal realm that death occupies in the human mind.
We are about to examine a subject that has invited intellectual
indulgence since man acquired a perception of the inevitability of
death. Of late, it is receiving attention of monumental proportions
from members of the public and the legal, theological, philophical,
* J.D. IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, Member Illinois State Bar. Legal
counsel for the Department of medical ethics of the American Medical Association.
The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge Edwin J. Holman, Director, AMA Depart-
ment of Medical Ethics.
1. Before proceeding with this article, the writer must emphatically make a dis-
claimer. This article is not an exposition of AMA beliefs or policies. As a result of
my affiliation I have had occasion to observe the formulation of AMA policy regarding
the present topic, and some of the views expressed in this paper parallel AMA views.
However, this paper is neither an official nor unofficial expression of any AMA position.
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journalistic and medical communities. Much of the discourse devoted
to death, however, is of dubious value because it does not seek to
make death less palatable, frightening, terrible or impounderable.
Rather, it advocates a cold, mechanistic approach to death.'
This observation is really my -point of departure for this paper.
With all due respect for those who have considered "death" before
me, whose immense intellectual capacities far exceed mine, with awe
at the care and diligence in their work, and with deference -to their
integrity and honorable intentions, I submit that it is to life not death
that we must turn our attention. By developing and improving life-
our concept of it, our respect for it, and our concern with improving
the quality of it-we can construct the foundations for a moral, ethical
and legal environment in which death may then be perceived, dealt
with and allowed to occur as a natural terminating function of life.
SEMANTICS-WHICH "TYPE" OF "EUTHANASIA" SHALL WE CONSIDER?
One of my favorite law professors liked to tell a story about a
lawyer who in 'the course of oral argument before the United States
Supreme Court answered one of the justices' questions with the casual
observation that "It's only a matter of semantics, your Honor." The
professor was then serving as clerk to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, -who
was not often motivated to stir during oral argument. Upon this occas-
ion, however, -the esteemed justice rumbled, rose and roared, "Young
man, the law is semantics!"
To avoid the obvious pitfalls in taking the semantics of this discus-
sion for granted, perhaps a brief look at the terminology involved will
be helpful. The definitions that follow are those of the writer, and
are submitted only for purposes of this discussion. If they be deemed
erroneous, so it may well be; ,but since there has been very little agree-
ment among scholars in this regard, they are likely to be as accurate
as any.
Throughout this paper it is hoped the reader will keep in mind
that its subject is a matter of "bio-ethics" and not one of "medical
ethics." The former term is generally used to denote the moral con-
siderations and principles concerned with life and living things, a broad
and wide-ranging topic which is not confined to the perspectives of
2. This mechanistic approach is especially evident in proposals to legislatively
define death and the circumstances in which it may be permitted to occur. Both of
these theories will be surveyed later in this paper.
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any single profession or field of endeavor.' Bio-ethics is inter-disci-
plinary. The latter term, on the other hand, denotes a set of profes-
sional standards applicable only to the practice of medicine,4 a far nar-
rower concept. Viewing questions about death from the standpoint
of medical ethics would, therefore, necessarily exclude legal, theologi-
cal and other implications which are indispensable -to a comprehensive
treatment of them. Thus, we are concerned here with a subject that
is properly within the scope of 'bio-ethics, not simply medical ethics.
Beyond agreement that "euthanasia" literally means "happy
death,"' there is no consensus as to its precise colloquial meaning.
The word generally connotes the taking of human life for other than
malicious purpose. It implies that some sort of humane or compas-
sionate motivation is the prime-mover in the taking. But definitional
problems arise in defining the character of the manner in which the
taking of life is accomplished.
Terminology such as "negative," "voluntary," or "passive-" eu-
thanasia, and its inverse corollary, e.g. "positive-," "involuntary-,"
or "active-" euthanasia has proliferated. 6 While the prefixes vary the
distinction is generally accepted that the former group describes the
taking of human life by the omission of some act essential to the
preservation of life' and the latter indicates the performance of some
affirmative conduct which directly results in the taking of life.8
Regardless of the specific term used or its precise definition, a
common thread ties them together; euthanasia is the taking of human
life, regardless of its motivation, or of whether it is an act or omission.
Euthanasia is not permitting death to occur or allowing the inevitable
to come about. To be sure, it could be defined to include these
things, but this would destroy any value the word might have.
3. See, Clouser, Some Things Medical Ethics Is Not, 223 J.A.M.A. 787 (1973);
Editorial, Bioscience - Bioethics, 220 J.A.M.A. 272 (1972).
4. L. LUKE, MEDICAL ETmcs 31-46 (1957); C. LEA.E, PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL
ETHucs 1, 5 (1927).
5. See notes 18-72, infra.
6. These exemplary terms are cited without authority at this point because each
writer assigns his own definition to whichever of them he selects for use. This will be-
come apparent as this article progresses. This writer prefers to not add to the confusion
already caused by lack of uniform definition with his own specific offering. Rather,
very broad descriptions of this terminology are offered. See notes 7 & 8 and accom-
panying text, infra.
7. The former group also usually includes instances wherein the person, or im-
mediate family of the person whose life is in balance, give consent to fatal omission.
8. The latter group usually includes that taking of life without consent or even
against the will of the person whose life is in question.
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By rejecting a definition of "euthanasia" that includes allowing
death to occur, a potentially valuable analytical perspective can be
gained. Making a distinction between "euthanasia" and "allowing
death"' permits discussion of their respective implications without
incurring the substantial semantic difficulties that have consumed
tmuch attention in prior discussions.
Perhaps the only other words in need of definition at this point
are three that represent the essence of the law, theology and philos-
ophy in this country: morality, ethics and law.9 Specifically, it is the
interrelationship and interdependence of the concepts inplicit in 'these
words that should be defined to help clarify the discussion about to
be presented. The following definitions are offered. "Morality" is
the recognition of qualities, such as correct or incorrect, and the appli-
cation of values, such as good or ,bad, to those qualities in order to
achieve a frame of reference within which to conduct the affairs of
life.10  There are a multiplicity of sources from which the morality
of our society has been drawn, but probably the most influencial of
these has been theology." "Ethics" is the systemization of a morality
in which standards of conduct are established."2 The efficacy of any
such system depends upon its voluntary adoption by the group of peo-
ple to which it applies.' 3  Religion exemplifies this. The mandatory
nature of "law" is the feature of that system of standardizing morality
which distinguishes it from ethics. Thus, while both ethics and law
erect standards of conduct for -the persons to which they apply, 'they
differ with respect to the methods of enforcement they use.'1
There is a common theme in morality, ethics and law: they all
involve making value judgments regarding the conduct of some person
9. The writer is aware that in discussing these concepts he invades the province
of some of the greatest thinkers of all time. He does not profess possession of adequate
qualification for this venture and accepts whatever criticisms may result from his lack
of expertise or naivet6.
10. Cf. Clouser, supra note 2, at 788; Moffat, The Indispensable Role of Inde-
pendent Ethical Judgment, 21 FLA. L. REv. 477 (1969); Barton, Sources of Medical
Morals, 193 J.A.M.A. 127 (1965); Allred, Legal Aspects of Euthanasia, 14 LINACRE
Q. 1, 2-3 (1947). The writer suggests that this definition not as expression of a partic-
ular moral philosophy, e.g. natural, pragmatic, etc., but only as a description of the
elements of any morality. Any suggestion that one morality is to be preferred to an-
other is purely unintentional.
11. While the words "theology" and "religion" are often used interchangeably,
the word "theology" is intentionally used here to indicate the influence of all religions
upon morality in our country.
12. Cf. notes 3 and 10, supra.
13. See notes 172-7 and accompanying text, infra.
14. Cf. Clouser, note 2 supra, at 788; Moffat, note 10 supra.
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or group of people. Each, with increasing degrees of particularity as
these value judgments progress from morality to ethics to law, defines
the idea of -the quality of life; and each, with increasing force, influ-
ences and regulates that quality. Theoretically, at least, if one of the
voluntary value judgment procedures is working effectively, then the
next successive one should not be required. For example, if an ethical
principle is generally adherred to by those to whom it applies and is
otherwise acceptable and desirable, then a law erecting a standard for
the same conduct should not be required. I I
Although it may seem unexpected, no definition of death will be
presented at this point. It is sufficient for the moment to state that
death is the cessation of life. In addition, no specification of a particu-
lar class of persons, e.g. the terminally ill, is offered at this point to
identify the targets of the practices being discussed. Defining either
of these concepts now would be premature in the context of the organ-
ization of this paper.' 6
CREATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF A CONTROVERSY-SURVEY
This section contains descriptions of some of the thoughts and ar-
guments of selected commentators on euthanasia. Selections were
made to provide a sample of the opinions that abound in the spheres
of legal, theological, medical and general literature.
1 7
For ease of consumption, the following survey is categorized by
area of endeavor: law, theology and medicine. No inference that this
15. This concept is similar to a pyramid: the foundation and broadest part of a
society's values are its morality; the next successive level upward, but narrower in scope,
are the ethics of groups within the society; and, the uppermost and least broad level is
the law. The law is "least broad" because, while it addresses virtually every form of
endeavor, it has real bearing upon only a few specific types of conduct. Each succes-
sive level of the pyramid is subject to control by the one above it.
16. One of the purposes of this article is to illustrate the confused semantics which
all too often have prevented the concepts of "death" and "euthanasia" from being
rationally discussed. It is hoped that by sifting through some of the most misused and
misunderstood terminology a more clear idea of the essential elements in a well rea-
soned analysis will become apparent.
17. Many of the authorities cited herein provide detailed and comprehensive ref-
erence lists, either in the form of bibliographies or footnotes. Some of these will be
alluded to in subsequent notes.
The writer has often been admonished by one mentor that the answer one gets is
determined by the question he asks. Other authorities agree. See Kamisar, note 23
infra, at 977 and n.30. And, so it is conceded that the result attempted to be achieved
by this article was determined well in advance of its actual composition. Realizing this,
an unconscious attempt was probably made to select source material so as to support
the desired result. In retrospect, however, the writer believes that even a perfectly
random selection would have yielded the same outcome.
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method of presentation is indicative of significance to be attached to
any subdivision is intended.
Legal Scholars
1. Helen Silving' s
Ms. Silving, as a Research Associate at the Harvard Law School,
made her contribution -to -the euthanasia controversy ostensibly as more
of an academic exercise than as an expression of viewpoint.19  As
such, it purports to be an exploration of the criminality of euthanasia
in various systems of law. Ms. Silving draws a distinction between
several unnamed ,types of euthanasia and thereby makes a case for
the need to reform the criminal law in this country to accommodate
motives that lack the desire to do harm, as well as the desires of the
person whose life is in the balance.2" (She avoids recommending that
some measurement of the value of the life in question be included
in the law reform she advocates). Though she considers legalizing
euthanasia, she appears to favor lessening criminal penalties for mercy-
motivated murder.2
Her conclusion is that euthanasia is murder within the context of
contemporary criminal law in this country because it includes the ele-
ments constituting that criminal offense, regardless of what it might
be called.22 This argument for criminal law reform has interested sub-
18. Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 350 (1954). Helen Silving was a Research Associate in Law at the Harvard
Law School when this article was published.
19. Id. at 350, 386.
20. Id. at 360-9, 386-7. Ms. Silving is one of the few writers who does not as-
sign names to types of euthanasia. She says, simply, "The most diverse acts have been
referred to under the common term 'euthanasia' ", describes some of them, and pro-
ceeds with her discussion. Id. at 351-2 and n.5.
21. Id. at 387-8. She states her reasons for this preference as follows:
In trying to find the proper solution, consideration should be given to
the prevailing mores of American society (footnote omitted). State con-
trolled euthanasia is predicated upon ethical approval of the act .... There
is no evidence that the majority of the American people approve of euthan-
asia, but it is reasonable to assume that most people consider a killing moti-
vated by mercy less reprehensible than killing for a base motive. Id. at 388.
22. Although Silving observes that many of the diverse acts often referred to as
euthanasia "are perfectly lawful under all systems of criminal law . . . ." Id. at 351,
and thereby recognizes that not all of those acts are in fact euthanasia, most other legal
scholars would disagree. For example, George Fletcher predicates his entire article on
the assumption that if conduct is called "euthanasia", it must be criminal. See
Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REV. 999 (1967) (discussed in notes 38-45 and
accompanying text, infra). See also, Sanders, Euthanasia: None Dare Call It Murder.
60 J. CuM. L. 351 (1969); Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A
Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539, 539-40 (1969); Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH.
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sequent legal scholars far less than proposals for legislation legalizing
some "form" of euthanasia. Nevertheless, Ms. Silving's recommenda-
tion that reform is warranted to bring the criminal law into harmony
with the manner in which it is frequently administered in euthanasia
cases is well presented and reasoned.
2. Yale Kamisar23 and Glanville Williams24
In 1958, and in response to noted legal scholar Glanville Williams,
Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Minnesota Law School re-
butted Williams' proposal to statutorily legalize "voluntary" euthanasia.
In Kamisar's article, "voluntary" euthanasia was defined by example:
"the cancer victim begging for death."2 5
Because he considers his views to be those of a non-religious util-
itarian ethician, Professor Kamisar challenges the ideas upon which
proposals for legislation to legalize euthanasia are most often predi-
cated. He orients his argument to Williams' views, but aims it at all
those who would support them.
Although it is impossible to capsulize Kamisar's detailed exposi-
tion, the following is a summary of the highlights of his article. To
Williams' contention that legislative action is necessitated by inequal
application of the criminal law in cases where euthanasia is apparently
involved, 26 Kamisar observes that "if inequality of application suffices
to damn a particular provision of the criminal law, we might as well
tear up all our codes . . ".2. Kamisar then argues that it is properly
within the purview of a jury to consider moral issues in its deliberations
and states that Williams' proposal would not cure the ills in existing
L REv. 239 (1970): Note, "Voluntary" Euthanasia, 36 ALBANY L. Rv. 674 675-8
(1973).
In her discussion of some "euthanasia" cases Ms. Silving points out that juries
will often aquit defendants who appear to have been motivated by mercy or compassion.
Silving, note 18 supra, at 352-4. This, she reasons, indicates a need for criminal law
reform. Id.
23. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Leg-
islation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
24. G. Wn.LiAMS, THE SANCTTY OF LIFE AND THE CUM rNAL LAw (1957) (herein-
after cited as "WILLIAMs"). Williams' book will be discussed concurrent with Kami-
sar's rebuttal to it. Williams himself replied to Kamisar in, "Mercy-Killing" Legisla-
tion-A Rejoinder, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1958). See also Williams, Euthanasia and
Abortion, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 178 (1966).
25. Kamisar, note 23, supra, at 969-70 and nn. 3 & 7.
26. Kamisar, note 23 supra, at 971 (quoting WrLLiAMs at 328); see id. at 971-2
and nn. 11-17.
27. Id. at 972.
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law, but would compound them.28
To Williams' argument that decisions regarding euthanasia should
be left to the discretion and common sense of physicians, 29 Kamisar
raises the central arguments in his: rebuttal-the possibility of mistake
and abuse, and the likelihood that "voluntary" euthanasia legislation
might someday be extended to include "involuntary" euthanasia."0
Kamisar agrees with Williams that the battlefiled is civil liberties but
questions whether the premature and unnatural death of but one indi-
vidual by mistake is worth relieving the pain and suffering of any num-
ber of others. 1
Mistakes and abuses can be prevented, or at least minimized, only
by erecting elaborate legal machinery or by somehow assuring the in-
fallibility of all physicians' medical judgment and moral scruples.32
The former alternative would preclude any possibility of expeditious
administration, and the latter would impose a burden upon medical
technology that it is incapable of assuming and that its practitioners
are unwilling to accept.3 Additional mistakes can be introduced into
whatever procedure might be established by difficulties in assessing
whether the person who purportedly requests death is in fact capable
of making such request freely and voluntarily, and by the possibility-
however slight-that an advance or breakthrough in medical tech-
nology could save and preserve, if not fully restore, the life in ques-
tion.
3 4
28. Id. at 973-4.
29. WILLIAMS at 339-42.
30. Kamisar, note 23 supra, at 976. In anticipatory rebuttal to the first objection
to his proposal, regarding mistakes, Williams says:
It may be allowed that mistakes are always possible, but this is so in any
of the affairs of life. And it is just as possible to make a mistake by doing
nothing as by acting. All that can be expected of any moral agent is that
he should do his best on the facts as they appear to him. Williams at 318.
Kamisar's surrebuttal is that "reasonable mistakes, then, may be tolerated if .. . these
are the inevitable by-products of efforts to save one or more human lives." Kamisar,
note 23 supra at 1008.
31. Id. at 976-7. It is in passages such as this that Kamisar betrays the moral
underpinnings of his analysis. His assurance that he leaves "the religious arguments
to the theologians" in the final analysis becomes unconvincing. The obvious morality
underlying it does not differ substantially from that which one might reasonably expect
of a theologian. Id. at 976-7, 974 and n.23.
32. Id. at 981, 984. Williams proposal to circumvent problems with logubrious
legal machinery is, of course, to elevate the role of the physician by giving them a free
hand to exercise singular discretion. WILLIAMS at 339-40. Kamisar cannot accept im-
posing such responsibility upon physicians, and raises the possibilities of criminal pros-
ecution and violation of moral principles to support his position. Kamisar, note 23
supra at 982 n.41.
33. Id. at 984, 993-1005.
34. ld. at 985-93. "[Is the adult patient (footnote omitted) really in a position
EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE
Williams himself acknowledged the possibility and, inferentially,
predicted the future acceptability of putting to death aged senile per-
sons, defective -infants and others whose mental or physical deficien-
cies make their lives somehow worth less than others when measured
on some abstract scale of quality of human life. 5  Williams' reasons
for anticipating this form of euthanasia are that someday -these "defec-
tive" people will cause problems in our society sufficiently serious to
warrant a change in present public opinion. Kamisar dismisses Wil-
liams' reasons for even raising -the possibility of extending legislation
to "defective persons" with a kind of moral pragmatism and the state-
ment that since he finds the proposal itself undesirable, the extension
of it would be even more so. He then applies his legal version of
the political "domino" theory and in asking "Where do we, how do
we, draw the line?" finds the killing of "defectives" utterly unaccept-
able."
One of the least emphasized but perhaps most persuasive argu-
ments by Kamisar is that since virtually all of the cases on the books
deal with "involuntary" euthanasia, -the proffered need for legislation
regulating "voluntary" euthanasia (grounded upon disapproval of the
rationale or results in -those cases) is at best imagined and is :at worst
the crass commercialization and exploitation of a topic to which the
public is sensitive. In spite of this, many scholars have persistesd to
disregard -their self-imposed definitional distinction between "volun-
tary" and "involuntary" euthanasia, and have -used inconsistencies in
the law regarding the latter to justify acting upon the former. When
ever such reasoning is relied upon as as: the basic premise for an argu-
ment -favoring legislation regulating "voluntary" euthanasia, it is hope
lessly illogical and therefore cannot be accepted without serious reser-
vation.3
7
to concur? Is he truly able to make euthanasia a 'voluntary' act? There is a good deal
to be said, is there not, for [the] pithy comment that the "voluntary' plan is supposed
to be carried out 'only if the victim is both sane and crazed by pain (footnote omit-
ted).' . . . When, then, does the patient make the choice? While heavily drugged
(footnote omitted)?" Id. at 985-6 (Emphasis added).
Here is an example of the question-asked-determines-the-answer-obtained reason-
ing. Rather than ask, "Should the patient be kept alive to await a new treatment that
may not be forthcoming?" Kamisar would ask, "Should the patient be put to death
when there is a possibility of some new treatment?" Id. at 993-1005.
35. WILLIAMS at 333-4, 348-50.
36. Kamisar, note 23 supra, at 1026, 1030-41. Kamisar calls this the "parade of
horrors" or "wedge" principle.
37. This observation is purely personal. In purusing the authorities, I am often
overcome with the impression that many of them write less out of true concern for the
subject and more for reasons related to sensationalism and notoriety.
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3. George Fletcher8s
After Professor Kamisar's article and Williams' rejoinder to it,8 9
there was a lull in the attention given the issue of euthanasia. How-
ever, when the first heart transplant operation came into the public
eye in 1967,40 death again became a popular subject for discussion
and debate. There was an urgent need to establish criteria for the
circumstances in which removal of vital organs for transplantation pur-
poses would be proper. Accompanying discourse on the need for
new definition of death was a renewed interest in "euthanasia."
George Fletcher, Assistant Professor of Law at the U'niversity of
Washington, directed his attention to the criminality of euthanasia.
His article seems to be an attempt -to return to the question of the
criminal liability involved in administering euthanasia. After enumer-
ating the common law elements of murder,4' his analysis focuses on
one of them, "an act resulting in death," and the criminality of an omis-
sion in the context of ,that element.4 2  He proposes that the desired
test should be "whether on all the facts we should be inclined to speak
of the activity as one that causes harm or one merely -that permits harm
to occur."'4s He thus makes a distinction between acts and omissions.
It turns upon the difference between "causation" and "permission."
Professor Fletcher then turns to the physician-patient relationship
to examine whether its scope includes the implied consent by a patient
to the omission of some medical treatment by his physician. 44  He
finds that "what doctors customarily do" determines -the existence of
that implied consent. He -thereby infers that if what doctors customar-
ily do includes -the giving of implied consent by their patients, then
an omission by a physician that permits harm to occur is not criminal
conduct. 5
38. Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REv. 999 (1967), reprinted 203
J.A.M.A. 65 (1968). This writer is a law professor, George P. Fletcher, who is to be
distinguished from theologian Dr. Joseph Fletcher, whose position is discussed in notes
59-71 and accompanying text, infra.
39. Supra notes 23-25.
40. See 202 J.A.M.A. 23 (1967).
41. Fletcher, note 38 supra, at 1002:
(1) an act resulting in death.
(2) an intent to inflict death.
(3) malice aforethought.
(4) absence of defenses.
42. Id. at 1004.
43. Id. at 1007. Only once during the course of his discussion does Fletcher
speak simply of "death" without referring concurrently to "harm."
44. Id. at 1009-14.
45. Id. at 1015.
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4. Luis Kutner
In a recent article, the Chairman of the World Habeas Corpus
Committee of the World Peace Through Law Center proposes an ap-
proach to "euthanasia" that is one of the most creative suggestions thus
far, the "living will." Without describing the first part of Mr. Kutner's
article, which follows what appears to have become a standard format
for legal writers,46 let us turn immediately to Mr. Kutner's proposal.
It is summarized as follows:
4 7
(a) The document would be referred to as a "living will," "testa-
ment permitting death," "declaration for ending treatment," or the
like.
(b) The purpose of the document would be to allow a person
to "indicate to what extent he would consent to treatment" while "fully
in control of his faculties and his ability to express himself."
(c) "The document would provide that if the individual's bodily
state becomes completely vegetative and it is certain that he cannot
regain his mental and physical capacities, medical treatment shall
cease."
(d) The document would be acted upon only with the approval
of a hospital committee or similar board which would "consider the
circumstances under which the document was made in determining the
patient's intent . . . and whether the condition of the patient has in-
deed reached the point where he would no longer want any treat-
ment."
To these provisions Mr. Kutner attaches several qualifications.
One of them specifies that the wills could not be executed by incompe-
tents incapable of consenting to medical treatment.48  Another pro
vides that the document could not authorize the commission of euthan-
asia.49
Mr. Kutner's proposal has been adopted by several organizations
46. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND.
LJ.-539)(1969).
-7. Id. at 551. Although he does not seem to care which or what label is at-
tached to the document he proposes, Kutner prefers "living will".
48. Id. at 552-3. Like Kamisar, the writer feels that most of us really do not
want to die, and can conceive of few instances if any in which a human being "would
no longer want" any treatment. See Kamisar, note 23 supra, at 1011. Paul Ramsey
agrees. See note 73-74 and accompanying text, infra.
49. Id. at 553. Kutner apparently believes that by any name, euthanasia is crim-
inal.
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and actively advocated by -them.5" Standard form "living wills" are
now available to the public and are used by a growing number of per-
sons. There are, however, several problems inherent in the use of
"living wills" which must be solved before their use may become well-
advised. The foremost of these are:51 (1) such documents are with-
out any legal effect; (2) the limited consent to treatment expressed
in them is not an expression of present intent or consent as such docu-
ments are only prospective in nature; and, (3) the suggestesd forms
are necessarily broad but therefore fatally vague and there is no ra-
tional way to expect laymen or even lawyers to correct these defects
and still achieve the desired result. In spite of these criticisms, the
"living will" may still be one of -the best methods yet proposed to deal
with human death and terminal illness humanely and efficaciously.52
5. Other Legal Scholars
The list of legal scholars devoting attention to the concept of
death is continually growing. As this survey is not intended to present
summaries of all the material available, brief reference has been made
to a representative sample and the remainder will be left to the curi-
ousity of the reader. A few more, however, are deserving of mention
without extensive comment.53
Joseph Sanders' position is that since the "present system of crim-
inal law, as fictitious as it sometimes is, has not yet worked a great
injustice on anyone committing euthanasia" and since "trial by jury
permits justice to be done without causing any tear in the conceptual
fabric of the law," a compelling case for changing the present situation
is difficult to prove.54  On the other hand, Howard Brill notes that
as the present law can be circumvented by a variety of techniques,
it is definitely in need of legislative change to legalize "voluntary" eu-
50. It would be entirely too presumptuous to credit Kutner with the idea for the
document he advocates, as such forms have been included in most of the legislative pro-
posals thus far advanced. E.g., see N. ST. JoHN-STEvAs, LIFE, DEATH AND THE LAW
267-8, App. XIV (1964).
51. Who can be certain today that tomorrow he will desire anything, much less
death? See Kamisar, note 23, supra, 1011.
52. The idea in and of itself has merit. It is in the implementing legislation and
the intricate mechanisms that inevitably must accompany it that such documents will
become difficult, if not impossible, to administer. See Kamisar, note 23, supra, at
978-82.
53. Two bibliographies worthy of comment, but not mentioned in the text, are
available from the National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, Maryland, and The In-
stitute of Society, Ethics and the Life Science, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.
54. Sanders, Euthanasia: None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. ClIm. L. 351, 357
(1969).
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thanasia. 55  In an article that may seem to present rather appealing
arguments favoring "voluntary" euthanasia, but which -upon careful
analysis fails to support those arguments with a substantial quantity of
supportive facts or any quality of persuasive reasoning, Professor Arval
Morris of the University of Washington law school adds yet another
article to those already mentioned. 56
A team of three law students recently compiled a most compre-
hensive survey of the legal ramifications of euthanasia.57 It touches
upon every conceiveable aspect of the subject within the reach of the
inquisitive mind, sometimes with less than thorough analysis. The sur-
vey does, however, provide valuable background and the footnotes




Recently, Dr. Fletcher left the modem-day euthanasia "contro-
versy" he started in 1954,59 still debating the merits of "voluntary"
euthanasia, and forged ahead into the area of "involuntary" euthanasia.
Where once this noted Professor of Medical Ethics supported the idea
of permitting patients to obtain a court order under conditions pre-
scribed by statute for the administration of "voluntary" euthanasia to
such patients, he now advocates the approval of "involuntary" eutha-
nasia.6 0
Starting with the premise that the issue of whether to permit "pas-
sive" or "negative" euthanasia (or "whether we may 'let the patient
go') is as dead as Queen Anne," Dr. Fletcher reasons that "it is
55. Note, Death With Dignity: A Recommendation For Statutory Change, 22
U. FLA L. REv. 368 (1970).
56. Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REv. 239 (1970).
57. Survey, 48 NOTRE D. LAWYER 1202 (1973). The footnotes to this survey
provide any interested investigator with an excellent reference list. Perhaps the only
problem with such a survey is its necessary brevity. This one, however, suffers from
an additional failing: it does not fully consider the positions of some of the authorities
relied upon. This writter is disappointed at the willingness of the students to accept
Professor Morris's position that religious grounds against proposed legislation are "con-
stitutionally irrelevant" without performing any analysis of it or interposing any chal-
lenge to it. Id. at 1259-60.
58. It is particularly difficult to provide the reader with a representative sample
of theological opinion. There is far too much material available to present other than
a general outline of some representative ideas.
59. See J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE 172-210 (1954).
60. See Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, 73 AM. J. NURSING 670 (1973). See
also Weber, Ethics and Euthanasia - Another View, 73 AM. J. NURSING. 1228 (1973),
for an initial rebuttal.
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harder morally to justify letting somebody die a slow and ugly death,
dehumanized, than it is to justify helping him to escape from such mis-
ery." 61 His justification for this view is, that adjustments to traditional
ethics, which are mandated by recent technological advances, enable
euthanasia to be justified as a reasonable means to achieve the term-
ination of life that is or has become useless. His "new ethics" is one
which emphasizes the quality of life, and the essence of his argument
is that the end of putting useless life to death, justifies -the means eu-
thanasia, because the positive value of the end, that of terminating use-
less life, outweighs the negative value of the means.62
Dr. Fletcher's new thesis necessarily raises several questions.
Who will determine when a life has become valueless? How will the
value of that life be determined? These questions cause him little
difficulty. He readily admits that scientific change has enabled us to
"play God," and argues that the "real question is: Which or whose
God are we playing?"6 3  Thus, because we are playing God, we can
morally justify evaluating -the quality of life exhibited by other human
beings and, if we find it useless, we can therefore justify ending it. 4
The position espoused by Dr. Fletcher is an extension of his
former position favoring "involuntary" euthanasia. Where once he be-
lieved that "consent is a common ethical consideration in all medicine
. . . [and] while it should never be perfunctory it will always have
to be substantial rather than perfect," 5 he would now de-emphasize
the importance of consent in determining who should die. Whereas
he once said that "we might choose death for ourselves more rightly
than we can choose it for others,"66 he would now have it chosen for
all who are "useless" or "defective."
Fletcher closes his disclosure on "involuntary" euthanasia with the
prediction that
The day will come when people will . . . be able to carry a card,
notarized and legally executed, which explains that they do not
want to 'be kept alive beyond the humanum point, and authorizing
the ending of their biological processes by any of the methods of
euthanasia which seems appropriate.
67
61. Fletcher, note 60 supra, at 670.
62. Id. at 674.
63. Fletcher, note 59 supra, at 674.
64. See Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tenative Profile of Man, 2 HAs-
TINGs REP. 1 (1972).
65. Fletcher, Our Shameful Waste of Human Tissue, essay in UPDATING LIFE
AND DATmat 1, 16-7 (1969).
66. Id. at 26-7.
67. Fletcher, note 59 supra, at 675.
EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE
Thus he still recognizes the precept that consent is important in any
euthanasia question. But this does not lessen the impact of his current
position advocating "involuntary" euthanasia and the obvious moral
questions raised by it.
2. Immanuel Jakobovits
In what is otherwise a dearth of written material available to the
lay public dealing with "death," Rabbi Jakobovits' book, Jewish Medi-
cal Ethics,8 stands out as an indication of the relationship of Jewish
moral and religious principles to that subject. Three conclusions re-
garding death and euthanasia are stated by the respected authority on
Jewish history, culture and religion. First, "the doctor is obliged 'ex
precepto charitatis' personally to inform the patient of the hopelessness
of his condition. . . . Any failure to do so involves the doctor in grave
sin, since he allows spiritual or material damage to occur which he
could have prevented." 69  Second, even when death is imminent and
inevitable the patient must be treated as though he were living by af-
fording his normal comfort and attention. Although death may not
be hastened, impediments to it may be removed and its agony should
not be lengthened. 70  Third, even when it is certain that death is near,
euthanasia is strictly prohibited. "In fact, it is condemned as plain
murder . . . . At the same -time, Jewish law sanctions, and perhaps
even demands, the withdrawal of any factor. . . which may artificially
delay [the patient's] demise in the final phase. 71
3. Paul Ramsey
As one of -the leading Christian ethicists of our time, Professor
Ramsey has had occasion to consider "death" in great depth and in
many contexts. In order to provide the reader with a succinct synop-
sis of his views, this survey is limited to Professor Ramsey's opinions
that relate most closely to the arguments advanced in favor of the
adoption of "voluntary" euthanasia legislation.
In orienting most of his discussions to patients for whom death
is both inevitable and imminent, Ramsey believes that "Fletcher's case
for voluntary euthanasia is morally complete so far as -the patient alone
68. (1959) [hereinafter cited as "Jakobovits"]. Another Jewish opinion is ex-
pressed by Rackman, Morality in Medico-Legal Problems, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1205
(1956).
69. Id. at 121-3.
70. Id. at 123-4.
71. Id. at 124.
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is concerned."7 2. Ramsey questions, however, whether the roles of
other parties in relation to the one whose life is in balance raise moral
issues not covered by Dr. Fletcher. He suggests that Dr. Fletcher's
justification for "inducing death" by equating it with "permitting death
to occur" may not be entirely justifiable on moral grounds.
[D]oing something and omitting something in order to do
something else are different sorts of acts. To do or not to do
something may, then, 'be subject to different moral evaluations.
One may be wrong and the other may be right, even if these de-
cisions and actions are followed by the same end result, namely,
the death of a patient.
What Fletcher has gained by an improper characterization of
actions that allow a patient to die while caring for him-by calling
them indirect voluntary euthanasia-is that, without abandoning
the case he and many other moralists have made for only caring
for the dying, he can the more readily succeed in apparently re-
ducing the warrants for omitting medical interventions to the moral
equivalent of the alleged warrants for acts of direct euthanasia.
But to respond in this way would exhibit a considerable mis-
understanding of the positive quality and proper purpose intended
in only caring for the dying. . . .These actions are fulfillments
of the categorical imperative: Never abandon care! . . . [T]hey
effectuate or hasten the coming of no end at all. Upon ceasing
to try to rescue the perishing, one then is free to care for the dy-
ing.73
Professor Ramsey's thesis is as simple as this: care for the dying.
He argues that it is necessary to establish the "moral limits properly
surrounding efforts to save life" so that medical treatment will cease
when appropriate, and caring for the dying will begin.7 4  He empha-
sizes a patient-oriented approach that centers on the life, not the death
of the dying patient. He takes a middle ground, adopting neither the
stand that there is never a reason to stop using life-sustaining medical
procedures, nor one that advocates killing terminal patients. Rather,
he prefers to leave the awesome decision regarding determination of
when cure has become impossible and when the process of dying com-
mences in a particular case to the physician and ,the patient together.
"The patient has entered a covenant with the physician for his com-
plete care, not for continuing useless efforts to cure. '75
72. Ramsey, Freedom and Responsibility in Medical and Sex Ethics: A Protestant
View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1189, 1200 (1956).
73. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON 151-3 (1970).
74. Id. at 144-57.
75. Id. at 134.
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4. Pope Pius XII
In an address to an international congress of anesthesiologists,
Pope Pius XII stated the position of the Roman Catholic Church re-
garding the prolongation of life with eloquent simplicity. It is hoped
that the following abstract does that address justice.
Does [the doctor] have the right, or is he bound, in all cases
of deep unconsciousness, even in those that are considered to be
completely hopeless . . , to use modem artificial respiration ap-
paratus . . . ?
[N]ormally one -is held to use only ordinary means-ac-
cording to circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture-
that is to say, means that do not involve any grave burden for
oneself or another. . . . On the other hand, one is not forbidden
-to take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life and
health, as long as -he does not -fail in some more serious duty
The rights and duties of the doctor are correlative to those
of the patient. The doctor, in fact, has no separate or independ-
ent right where the patient is concerned. In general he can take
action only if the patient explicitly or implicitly, directly or indir-
ectly, gives him permission. The technique of resuscitation which
concerns us here does not contain anything immoral in itself.
Therefore the patient, if -he were capable of making a personal
decision, could lawfully use it and, consequently, give the doctor
permission to use it. On the other hand, since these forms of
treatment go beyond the ordinary means to which one is bound,
it cannot be held that there is an obligation to use them or, conse-
quently, that one is bound to give the doctor permission to use
them.7
6
5. Other Theological Views
Several churches have adopted positions regarding death and eu-
thanasia. 77 Summaries of the views of those churches that have issued
formal statements follow.
76. Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life, 4 POPE SPEAKS 393, 397-8 (1958).
77. For other theological and philosophical opinion not referred to here the reader
may wish to consult: Reeves, When Is It Time to Die? Prolegomenon To Voluntary
Euthanasia, 8 NEw ENGL. L. REv. 183 (1973) (includes excellent bibliography); Sym-
posium, Contemporary Themes, BRrr. MED. J., Jan. 6, 1973, at 29; Veatch, Choos-
ing Not To Prolong Dying, MED. DIMENSIONS, Dec., 1972; D. HENDIN, DEATH AS A
FACT OF LIFE (1972) (a collection of essays with an excellent bibliography); K. MANN,
DEADLINE FOR SURVIVAL 92-106 (1970) (this book was prepared as a result of a study
conducted for the Episcopal Church); Reid, Prolongation of Life or Prolonging the Act
of Dying? 202 J.A.M.A. 181 (1967); Whitlow, Extreme Measures to Prolong Life,
202 J.A.M.A. 226 (1967).
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The American Lutheran Church 78
While life is precious, there comes for every person that time when
his earthly existence must end. The Lutheran hospital . . . be-
lieves that he is entitled to die with dignity . . . The Lutheran
hospital stands firm in its opposition to compulsory euthanasia
... . It does not lend its facilities to any active intervention 'that
arbitrarily and ruthlessly brings about the death of any person who
comes to it for care and treatment.
United Church of Christ
7 9
We believe it is ethically and theologically proper for a person to
wish to avoid artificial and/or painful prolongation of a terminal
illness and for him or her to execute a living will or similar docu-
ment, at times, may workk to the harm of the patients . . . . We
believe that there comes a time in the course of an irreversible
terminal illness -when, in the interest of love, mercy and compas-
sion, those who are caring for the patient should say: 'Enough.'
We do not believe simply the continuance of mere physical exis-
tence is either morally defensible or socially desirable or is God's
will.
United Methodist Church8 °
We assert the right of every person to die in dignity, with loving
personal care and without efforts to prolong terminal illness merely
'because the technology is available to do so.
Physicians
1. Walter Sackett, Jr.
Probably the most outspoken, if not the most widely publicized
physician to address the subject of death is Walter Sackett. This is
because he is not only a physician who professes to have allowed
countless of his patients to die,"' but is a Florida state representative
as well. In his latter capacity he has on several occasions since 1969,
introduced a bill into the Florida legislature to amend the state con-
stiution's Declaration of Rights to include the right to be permitted
to "die with dignity."8 2  In support of his proposal, Dr. Sackett assumes
78. Pamphlet, Ethical and Policy Guidelines for a Lutheran Hospital Lutheran
Hospital Association, 1966.
79. Statement, The Rights and Responsibilities of Christians Regarding Human
Death, Council for Christian Social Action, United Church of Christ, June 25, 1973.
80. Report of the Social Principle Study Commission, United Methodist Church,
April, 1973.
81. Sackett, I've Let Hundreds of Patients Die, Shouldn't You? MED. ECON.
Apr. 2, 1973, at 92, 97; Sackett, Death With Dignity: A Recommendation for Statu-
tory Change, 59 J. FLA. MED. ASSN 82 (1972).
82. Note, Death With Dignity: A Recommendation for Statutory Change, 22
U. FLA. L. REv. 368 (1970).
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his role as a physician and advances two arguments: a multitude of
his patients want to be allowed to die with dignity, and the medical
profession should be protected from legal vulnerability. 3
Dr. Sackett places several conditions on the exercise of the right
he would constitutionally enunciate. Among -them are that the pa-
tient's condition must be irreversibly terminal, his condition must be
incurable within the definition of the then current state of medical
technology and the patient, his family or a medical review board must
request or concur in any decision to permit the patient to die.
84
2. Sackett's Opponents
The physicians who oppose Dr. Sackett's proposal readily concede
that "no doctor would advocate useless treatment when life is irretriev-
able."8 5  This opposition is grounded on the argument that the bill,
if adopted, would not accomplish any useful or helpful purpose, much
less change or introduce anything that cannot presently be done with-
out such a measure. It is not properly within the purview of a medical
practitioner to do anything except help his patient. 86
This argument against Dr. Sackett's position is founded on the
view that he would have the physician become an executioner, acting
so as to accomodate death, whereas he should never act with respect
to anything but life.8 7 Mistakes in diagnosis and treatment can be and
are made. New cures can be and are developed. Heroic measures
to save life can and do produce hope and comfort for the dying patient.
Pain and suffering can be controlled. "Loneliness and de-personaliza-
tion cause the terminally ill more suffering than the pain does."'88
Whereas Dr. Sackett views the problem as one of "death," his
opponents view it as one of "life." In neither view is it denied that
mistakes are possible, heroic measures can be of value, and pain and
suffering should be minimized. It is perhaps fear of "judicious neg-
lect" that compels Sackett opponents to speak out.89
The other aspect of the argument against Sackett that his bill "is
83. Id.
84. See note 82 supra.
85. See Epstein, No, It's Our Duty to Keep Patients Alive, MED. EcoN., Apr. 2,
1973, at 97; Evans, Is This Legislation Really Necessary?, 59 J. FLA. MED. ASSN.
51(1972).
86. See Epstein, note 85 supra, at 108-9.
87. Id. at 102-3.
88. Id. at 103.
89. Evans, note 85 supra, at 53.
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useless, meaningless and superfluous [and] is founded on 'the opinion
that there is no legal or medical justification for it."90  In addition,
there is no apparent indication of any rational and well-informed pub-
lic demand for it.9 Such legislation would unnecessarily confine the
judgment and conduct of the physician to its terms alone. Whereas
he can now -handle death and communicate with his patient and the
immediate family simply and quietly, the proposed bill would en-
tangle the situation with legal requirements and could even promote
malpractice litigation. "It would serve the people and their physicians
best 'to desist from pushing legislation which has no useful or helpful
purpose and which would accomplish nothing more than can be done
without it."92
3. Survey of Physicians
In 1958, 418 physicians at two Seattle hospitals were sent a ques-
tionnaire intended -to acquire their views of death and euthanasia, inter
alia.9s Without commenting upon the adequacy of the statistical basis
used, some of -the results of that survey are included in this article
for purposes of clarity and comprehension.
Most of the physicians at both hospitals favored omitting proce-
dures and medications which would probably extend life if such omis-
sion is at the request of -the patients or, where necessary, their immed-
iate families. A greater majority of physicians who were in practice
at community hospitals held 'this view than their colleagues at the uni-
versity ("teaching") hospitals. The surveyors attempted to explain
this difference by proposing four possible theories. First, doctors in
community hospitals see more patients and hence more death than
those at -teaching hospitals. Second, the house staff, i.e. interns and
residents, at teaching hospitals has less occasion to counsel its patients.
Third, "the teaching how to preserve life in the university setting is
often so powerful that it may overwhelm any -thoughts of euthanasia."
Lastly, the nature of the illnesses treated at university hospitals may
be "biased toward -those (patients) who do not want to die."'94
90. Id. at 53.
91. Id.
92. Id. Other individual physicians in addition to Epstein and Evans do not hold
with Sackett's view that legislation is required. See Elkington, The Dying Patient,
The Doctor, and The Law, 13 VILLA. L. REV. 740 (1968): Frohman, Vexing Prob-
lems in Forensic Medicine: A Physician's View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1215 (1956).
93. Brown et al, The Preservation of Life, 211 J.A.M.A. 76-8 (1970).
94. Id. It should be noted that there are those who would advance the opposite
hypothesis, arguing that the lesser patient load enables teaching hospital staffs to have
more time for patients.
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Forty percent of the doctors polled approved of signed state-
ments, "living wills", permitting the withdrawal of necessary life-sup-
port equipment or medication. However, a clear majority indicated
that they would practice "negative" euthanasia in the absence of
signed authorization.9"
Thirty-one percent of the respondents "favored change in social
attitudes which would allow positive euthanasia to be carried out in
selected patients." Nearly that percentage indicated they would prac-
tice "positive" eithanasia, social attitudes permitting. 6  About half
of the physicians favored establishment of panels or review boards for
consultation in cases presenting difficult philosophical or moral ques-
tions. These were essentially the same doctors who favored utilizing
authorization statements and who, therefore, would be less likely to
encounter such problems.97
4. Medical Organizations
In April of 1973, the House of Delegates (policy making body)
of the Connecticut State Medical Society approved a statement regard-
ing "a patient's right to die in dignity." The statement approved a
standard form "living will" for use by persons wishing to express their
wishes in the event they could no longer do so orally and to provide
a means for permitting their deaths to occur.9" This is the only med-
ical professional organization that has adopted or approved the use of
a pro forma "living will".
Several other organizations of physicians have expressed their
policies regarding death in the context of the practice of medicine
without resort to signed statements. Although this would appear to
be contradictory to the attitudes apparent in the doctors responding
to the survey discussed above, three state medical associations have
done so and more are considering similar action.9 9 What they appear to
95. Id. at 79.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 80.
98. Resolution, Dignity In Life and In Death, House of Delegates, Connecticut
State Medical Society, April, 1973.
99. E.g., Resolution, House of Delegates, Medical Society of the State of New
York, February, 1973:
The use of euthanasia is not in the province of the physician. The right
to die with dignity, or the cessation of the employment of extraordinary
means to prolong life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that bio-
logical death is inevitable, is the decision of the patient and/or the immediate
family with the approval of the family physician. Id.
The State Medical Society of Wisconsin said simply, "mhe act of killing individuals
that are hopelessly sick or injured for reasons of mercy [is opposed]." Resolution,
House of Delegates, State Medical Society of Wisconsin, March, 1973.
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enunciate are the views of their members without confining them and
patients alike to fixed forms. The recent statement of the House of
Delegates of the American Medical Association is exemplary: 00
The intentional termination of the life of one human being
-by another-mercy killing-is contrary to the policy of the Ameri-
can Medical Association.
The cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to
prolong the life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that
'biological death is imminent is the decision of the patient and/or
his immediate family. The advice and judgment of the physician
should 'be freely available to the patient and/or his immediate
family.
With this statement the AMA seeks not only to encourage its
members to practice good medicine, including both the technological
and human aspects of it, but also to recognize that death and dying
are exclusively within the province of the individual. It is not within
the province of the physician to judge who should die. His task is
to determine when, and in some instances, how, -that death occurs. His
mercy and compassion should be directed toward the patient in the
form of the medical care he provides, including full discussion of the
medical circumstances involved in the patient's condition. Given this,
the patient must then confront death and dying in the comfort and
intimacy of his privacy.'
CONTROVERSIAL CONSENSUS
The foregoing section of this discussion was primarily intended
to provide the reader with a general view of some opinions regarding
euthanasia. Its principal purpose was to illustrate and thereby circum-
stantially underscore the notion that the controversy over euthanasia
is due more to unsettled and confused semantics than to disagreement
100. Report, The Physician and the Dying Patient, Judicial Council Report B,
American Medical Association, adopted Dec. 5, 1973. This report was adopted after
over six months of intensive study the AMA Judicial Council (its committee on eth-
ics). After AMA President-Elect Dr. Malcolm C. Todd called for the appointment of
a national commission to study whether "euthanasia" has a place in the practice of
medicine, see The Washington Post, June 29, 1973, at p. A14, the Judicial Council
consulted with a panel of leading authorities (including some of the authorities cited
herein) and polled AMA members and over fifty professional groups. Thus, the report
reproduced in the text is the result of gathering many diverse opinions, considering
them in relation to medical ethical principles and achieving a rational result.
101. The AMA rendered no stated opinion as to the desirability of legislation
legalizing "voluntary" euthanasia or its possible ramifications regarding the "involun-
tary" type.
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over basic substantive issues. With the exception of Joseph Fletcher
and possibly Glanville Williams, who appear to use approval and ra-
tionalization to justification for "involuntary" or "active" type, euthan-
asia most authorities either condemn the taking of human life without
the consent or against the will of the person whose life is in question,
or -they avoid the subject altogether. They agree that pain and suffer-
ing should not be prolonged in instances where death is imminent and
inevitable, and when the patient requests termination of life-support-
ing medical treatment.
The crux of the semantic problem arises in attempting to differ-
entiate between "allowing death to occur" and what the writers persist
in calling "voluntary" or "passive" euthanasia. Those who would prefer
to some type of euthanasia even though they qualify their name for
it and emphasize that it is undertaken with the consent or approval
of the patient and with the most merciful and compassionate of motiva-
tions-are still nevertheless speaking of the taking of a human life.
To make this taking more palatable, they further qualify their chosen
terms so that it is limited to only terminally ill patients (not "persons")
who are doomed to die in a matter of days anyway. By the time
they are finished adding qualifiers to their definitions (of whatever
terminology -they select), they are, in essence and in fact, talking
about "permitting death to occur."
Sometimes terms such as "extraordinary treatments," "artificial
means" -and "heroic measures" are used to describe medical efforts
aimed at attempting to preserve the lives of dying patients.102 They
can contribute to the confusion surrounding euthanasia. But here
again, even though they may fail to recognize it, there is essential
agreement among the authorities. 10 3  For example, suppose that a
physician has obtained, either from the patient or his immediate fam-
ily, an authorization in the nature of a "living will". Assume further
that the patient in question is unconscious -and suffering from a ter-
minal disease which involves great pain and discomfort, for which
there is no presently known cure and which will, so far as medical
technology is concerned, inevitably lead to his death within a short
time. Upon these assumptions, precisely what conduct on the part of
the physician constitutes "voluntary" or "indirect" euthanasia, and what
constitutes "allowing death to occur"?
102. Most of the authorities utilize such language. For an enlightened discussion
of some of these terms, see Ramsey, note 72 supra, at 118-24.
103. See authorities cited notes 18-72, supra.
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Suppose a new medication which might cure the patient's afflic-
tion has just been authorized for experimentation on human subjects.
Is it an "extraordinary treatment"? If so and it is not administered,
when the patient dies is this euthanasia, or simply death? If the new
drug is used and the patient lives for two days, was it an "artificial
means" that kept him alive? What if he lives for -two years? Suppose
the patient is being treated with a respirator. Is -the device an "artifi-
cial means?" If so and it is unplugged, when the patient dies, is this
euthanasia or death?
In pursuing these questions perhaps the reader is inclined to de-
sire more information to formulate his answers. Just what ailment
does the patient have? Who gave the authorization? Why? How
old is ,the patient? How long has he suffered? The questions could
become an imponderably involved inquisition.
Perhaps a committee or board should be appointed or designated
to look in-to this matter with all the care and discretion it deserves.
It could construe the authorization, assess all of -the facts, interpret the
possible medical alternatives and reach a decision upon which some
type of conduct might then be appropriate. But, in the meanwhile,
what of the patient? What should his doctor do now?
Without implying that the definitions of terms such as "extraor-
dinary -treatments" -are irrelevant in a given case, it is submitted that
their uses and meanings are not proper reasons for maintaining any
controvesy. Their definitions -are a matter of circumstance, a function
of too many necessary component viariables for them to be used in
a conceptual discussion. 104
Thus we return to the subject at hand, euthanasia, to find that
there really is no controversy. The "type" of euthanasia that the au-
thorities support is really "permitting death to occur".
The only visible purpose -that can be served by referring to a
"type" of euthanasia is to trade upon the connotations that the word
euthanasia carries with it. If those who refer -to "voluntary" euthanasia
would not further qualify their definitions with provisions that their
terminology is specifically aimed 'at patients for whom death is immi-
nent and inevitable (using whatever language they chooses to attach
to this additional qualification), then a controversy might indeed exist.
If, for example, one would speak of denying or removing the insulin
of a diabetic his request and out of compassion because he has con-
104. See Ramsey, note 72 supra, at 118-24.
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tracted terminal cancer, 10 5 ,then one might be speaking of "passive"
or "voluntary" euthanasia, and there might be some controversy.
Opinion is uniform regarding the propriety of euthanasia. 106  It
is condemned. It is criminal. It should not be permitted. Perhaps
the penalties for it should be mitigated according to the motivation
behind it, but nevertheless there should be a penalty for it.' 
7
Opinion is also uniform regarding the propriety of allowing death
to occur. It is condoned. It is not criminal. It is morally accept-
able. 108
The only real question that remains is whether it is either neces-
sary or desirable to legislate any aspect of the natural termination of
life.10 9
MORALITY, ETHICS AND LAW
This portion of the discussion is devoted to whether legislation
regarding "death" and "dying" is warranted. In considering this ques-
tion a three part approach will be offered. This will define the three
levels of value judgments the writer assigns to the processes of conduct
appraisal utilized in our society, and to assist the reader in selecting
one of them for his or her approach to the question.
Morality
Many of the authorities cited above refer to the concept of death
as one which grips human interest. It concerns all of us. At one
time or another, like it or not, we all ponder death, realizing it is in-
evitable. We tend to think about death as an abstract occurence in
the lives of others rather than as something that will occur in our lives.
However we may approach it, we all 'hold opinions about death. Even
105. This example was propounded by Ramsey in his discussion. Id. at 129-30.
Perhaps by this time the reader who is familiar with Ramsey's philosophy has noticed
that the viewpoint and the views expressed in this article are essentially parallel der-
rogations of those advanced by Professor Ramsey. For one interested in reading philo-
sophical exposition of the subject at hand with the eloquence of a master reference to
Ramsey is mandatory.
106. As used here, the word "euthanasia" is as defined by the writer. See notes
3-7 and accompanying text, supra.
107. The writer takes no stand regarding this possibility.
108. This observation is made with the hope that Fletcher and Williams's advocacy
of euthanasia as morally proper does not express the views of any significant number
of people in our society, much less any number of the intellectuals who engage in these
discussions.
109. This phraseology is used only to signify that the semantics have now been
resolved and the discussion now turns to substantive issues.
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those who say they do not think about it at all are thereby expressing
an opinion about it. Regardless of what our various opinions may be,
we share the characteristic of assigning a value judgment to death.
The most elementary mechanism for making our value judgments
is what might be called morality-the recognition of qualities and the
application of values to those qualities -to achieve a frame of reference
within which to conduct our lives.110 It is impossible to know how
much of our morality is instinctive and how much is learned. From
birth we are imparted with instinctive perceptions and bombarded with
environmental influences. As we grow we begin thinking in terms
of good and bad, correct and incorrect, right and wrong. We organ-
ize things into groups and systems, and we characterize them as good
and bad, correct and incorrect, right and wrong. We think about
other people, and we also characterize them. Life becomes a way-
a philosophy, if you will-of looking at things and others. It becomes
a series of value judgments made according to that philosophy. Thus,
we acquire a morality and govern our own lives by that morality.
As a result of our morality we assign a value to life itself; we
make a value judgment about life. This value judgment has nothing
whatever to do with anything but our personal morality. Each of us
assigns his own value to his own life and the lives of others about him.
To the extent that we agree that 'human life has value, we share
common morality; to the extent that we disagree about the measure
of that value, we must adopt a common frame of reference to accomo-
date our respective moralities. 111
Joseph Fletcher attempts to construct that frame of reference for
us in his proposal favoring euthanasia. In so doing he gets entrapped
in form, forsaking substance. His system would impose values rather
than accomodate them; it would quantify qualities rather -than identify
110. Here, I return to the definitions submitted at notes 9-16 and accompanying
text, supra.
111. I must again reiterate that it is not my intention to be labelled a pragmatist,
utilitarian, naturalist or whatever. Thus, I do not advance any explanation for how one
might acquire the notion that human life has value, I simply observe that in anyone's
morality human life is an inextracable element. See Moffat, The Indispensable Role of
Independent Ethical Judgment, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 480-2 (1969); Nichols, Pro-
files of Ethics: A Tribute to Lewis Miller Stevens, 363 ANNALS 1 (1966); Barton,
Sources of Medical Ethics, 193 J.A.M.A. 127, 134-6 (1965).
Nations, or in fact any form of society, local communities, cities and
states, have reputations and present images to mankind based upon their con-
duct . . . . These behavior patterns are often described in terms involving
value judgments: they are deemed either good or bad. . . . (T)he descrip-
tion of a community profile of ethics may be difficult to capture and record,
for its elements may be complex and blurred. Nichols at 1.
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them. In Dr. Fletcher's system, philosophical perspectives and moral
approaches must all be categorized and named." 2  Euthanasia must
be dissected into four parts."' Life must be measured on a scale.
Death must be statutorily defined. Subjected to all of this categoriza-
tion, naming, dissection, measurement and definition his argument
looses the quality of persuasiveness.
Similarly, subjected to these things the quality of life also suffers
a loss. By categorizing people they loose the ability to change. By
naming ideas they become less conceptual. By dissecting life into
childhood and adulthood the continuum of growth becomes obscured.
By measuring success life looses capacity for happiness. By legislating
conduct life looses the fullness of natural freedom. With a realiza-
tion that it is sometimes necessary to perform these quantifications to
preserve and protect our common morality, and that restricted life
qualities can be better than none at all, perhaps Dr. Flethcer goes too
far. The quantification he advocates for determining the quality of
life and those persons qualified to retain it, in a very real sense, de-
humanize us all. To say that any life is so utterly useless and without
value that it should be extinguished is to deny that there is a nameless
quality in all of us which is distinctly, uniquely and lovingly human.
By acknowleding the value of life we recognize death. Regard-
less of how we conceive of it, death is that inevitable mysterious qual-
ity in life that gives our values a sense of reality. It imparts to us
and our morality an urgency that makes time important. It is no less
a quality than love, and no less an integral part of our morality.
Ethics
One of the frames of reference for morality is ethics-the sys-
temization of morality into standards of conduct for a defined group
of people." 4  Each such system depends upon voluntary adherence
112. See Fletcher, note 60 supra, at 674-5. Fletcher categorizes euthanasia as:
1. voluntary and direct, 2. voluntary but indirect, 3. direct but involuntary, or 4. both
indirect and involuntary. Id. at 673.
113. See Fletcher, note 64 supra. (Fletcher proposes, for example, that I.Q. could
be used to measure the value of a given life).
See also Fletcher, note 60 supra, at 675. Of all the verbal exercises in which
Fletcher seems to engage, Ramsey says, "Fletcher's is a persuasive use of language, not
a convincing one. Writing primarily as a proponent of euthanasia (current usage),
he subscribes along the way to an ethics of only caring for the dying. By calling the
latter 'indirect euthanasia' his words, at least, gain the force of suggesting that this
point of view is not quite as honest or forthright as 'direct' euthanasia." Ramsey,
note 72 supra, at 150-1.
114. See authorities cited note 111, supra.
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to it by the members of a specified group in specified circumstances.
Each member accepts the morality of the system and follows the indi-
cated standards of conduct. This does not mean that he betrays his
personal morality as a member of society. Rather, it admits that in
addition to being a member of society, he is also a member of a
smaller, more specifically defined group. Thus, a church pre-
scribes religious ethics for its membership, the practice of medicine
includes standards of professional conduct known as medical ethics,
and so forth.
Because of its interdisciplinary nature, bio-ethics is more difficult
to define and comprehend than other ethics.115 Because many mem-
bers of many groups are concerned with bio-ethics, it surpasses the
realm of the ethics of any one of these groups. Bio-ethics is in reality
a systemization of the morality of our entire society. Its applicability
to biologicial life necessarily includes all mankind, and its inclusion of
the specific discipline of theology, medicine and law sets up various
sub-systems within the major system. The bio-ethics involved in per-
mitting human death to occur will illustrate this.
When a human being for whom death is imminent and inevitable
is allowed to expire, the major system of bio-ethics as well as many
of its sub-systems are involved. Basic human morality operates to
make possible value judgments regarding pain and suffering. It also
enables the laymen involved in the process to judge that the end of
a life is near. Religious ethics may apply similarly to the laymen, and
they would of course be particularly appropriate in guiding the involve-
ment of a clergyman in the counselling and comforting of -the other
participants." 6  Medical ethics is apposite to the attending physician
in designating his professional responsibilities. 1 7  In this situation, no
single ethics predominates. Rather, each sub-system contributes ,to
the whole and in concert they operate as bio-ethics to enable the mak-
ing of a value judgment upon the entire situation. Accordingly, a con-
clusion is achieved and conduct recommended.
The most difficult problem of ethics is enforcement. This is a
problem common to all systems of ethics, regardless of the group to
115. For the definition of bio-ethics offered here, the writer has relied primarily
on the teachings of Edwin J. Holman, whose comprehension and understanding of the
topic have been applied here to derive the ideas presented.
116. See Williamson, Life or Death - Whose Decision? 197 J.A.M.A. 139, 141
(1966); see, generally, Ramsey, note 72 supra.
117. See id.; see also, Principles of Medical Ethics, American Medical Association
(1967).
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which they apply. 18 In theory, at least, ethical principles are not the
pontifical pronouncements of a small, elite superstructure imposed
upon -the foundation group in order to arbitraily specify unrealistically
lofty standards of conduct. They are the common sense consensus of
the group, intended to translate morality into useful guidelines for the
conduct of the affairs which form the basis of the group. As such
they are understandable and acceptable to the members of the group.
The common welfare is promoted by adherence to them because they
serve as realistic goals for the group members and enable presentation
of a single image to persons outside the group. Thus, enforcement
of ethical principles should not be difficult. Even if enforcement is
not a major problem for a given group, the few cases of disobedience
that do arise can be hard to handle because the group has little puni-
tive power. Voluntary standards do not lend themselves well to invol-
untary punishment.
Perhaps the most cohesive force in any ethics is one which is very
subtle, and yet is also the one which enables enforcement to be effec-
tive. It is impossible to assign a name to that cohesive force. It is
that intangible factor that explains why one likes -to go to a particular
church, why doctors all seem to act like doctors, and why lawyers seem
enjoined to act like lawyers. Perhaps it is something in their training
and education; perhaps it is something they share in getting together
at the end of a busy day or week. Whatever it might be called -
fraternalism, brotherhood, professionalism-it is the core of the group,
the rallying point, the reason why eligible persons desire membership
and correspondingly why they voluntarily adhere to the group stand-
ards and accept group discipline." 9
Given a group wherein its ethics are accepted and followed, and
wherein its discipline is effective, there is no need for any other con-
trol or regulation of its group-related activities. So long as internal
control works, any additional, external regulation is superflous. It is
only when the group looses the ability to govern itself that the force
of law should come -to bear upon the group members.
Law
The law is the ethics of government, the standards which the gov-
118. See generally, Carroll, The Ethics of Transplantation, 56 A.B.A.J. 137 (1970);
Blake, Should the Code of Ethics in Public Life Be Absolute or Relative? 363 ANNmS
4 (1966).
119. Here, again, I rely upon the ideas of a friend. I am in agreement with them
and grateful for his sharing them.
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ernment imposes upon its constituency. In -this country the law should
be those standards which the people impose upon -themselves. And,
as the people each possess a morality, their law should be a reflection
of their common morality. To say that law is without morality is to
deny that it has any purpose whatever.
In regulating our lives by defining our freedom and limiting our
conduct, our law recognizes that indivual qualities and values must be
preserved by circumscribing the extent to which any among us can im-
pose his values upon or interfere with those of others. Laws, like ethi-
cal systems, establish standards of conduct.120 But, unlike ethics, laws
also set up the means of mandatory enforcement. They contain mech-
anisms for ensuring that they are carried out and for punishing those
who disobey.'21
Thus, law is the uppermost trier of morality.' 22  It is the standard
that supersedes the others when those others become ineffectual, un-
manageable or incapable of coexisting with each other. It should be
resorted to only when there is evidence that moral vales are threat-
ened or violated. How much and what kind of evidence should re-
quire the intercession of law is a matter for resolution by government.
For the sake of this discussion, however, the arguments favoring adopt-
ion of legislation regarding euthanasia are next examined to see if they
appear to contain persuasive evidence in support of their positions.
1. Definitions of Death
The type of legislation most often promoted by the authorities
cited in this discussion would regulate conditions for permitting death
to occur. Those proposals will be discussed shortly. Before doing
so, however, another type of legislation which has received some atten-
tion will be briefly examined. These are the statutes that would sim-
ply define "death".
In the law, the determination of death is often a critical element
in ascertaining the rights of the living. Ownership of property
changes, control of business, wealth and political organizations are al-
tered by death. In the law, then, it is often necessary to know that
the life of one person has in fact ended in order -to know how the
lives of others will continue.
120. See, Reid, note 77 supra, at 181 (quoting Holman); Allred, Legal Aspects
of Euthanasia, 14 LINACRE Q. 1, 2 (1947).
121. Id.
122. This, of course, is the writer's "pyramid" concept. See note 16 supra; see
also, Allred, note 120 supra, at 2.
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The need to know when the law will declare that death has oc-
curred is usually satisfied by a simple criterion: the cessation of life.' 23
For years, this simple, straight-forward standard has been applied in
the law with little embellishment or statutory authority. It has been
widely accepted without the neccesity of legislative mandate.
Recently, however, some have concluded that this legal definition
of death as the cessation of life must be made more precise and
specific. They argue that death has become too complex to be de-
fined so simply; and they urge that statutes must be enacted to provide
the desired precision and specificity.
One of -the overriding concerns of those who advocate statutory
definitions of death is the protection of potential donors in organ trans-
plantation procedures. After the first heart transplant in 1967,124 the
problem of protecting heart donors came into sharp focus. The ques-
tions were posed-and properly so: When is a potential donor dead?
How should the proper time to remove a donor's heart be determined?
Who should make the determination of death? Thus, we ask: Is leg-
islation necessary to ensure that the answers to these questions are
specified and enforced?
At once, after the first heart transplant, -these questions became
the issues in a worldwide debate. There was a fear that donors' hearts
might be prematurely removed for transplantation, thereby removing
all hope of recovery or survival for the donors.' 25
The intellectual community set to work at once to prevent this
awful fate for those whose hearts might be removed for transplanta-
tion. Mighty discourse ensued. All were resolved -to prevent the pos-
sibility that someone might be killed to obtain his heart for use by
someone else. Definitions of death were formulated, guidelines were
issued for cardiac surgeons and the cry went up that "there oughta
be a law!"
Although most of the reports that were issued were oriented to
heart transplantation problems, they are also relevant to matters which
concern us more directly. While few of us may ever be involved in
an organ transplantation, all of us will probably be involved with the
deaths of other human beings. Some of the deaths we perceive may
123. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1957).
124. See note 40 and accompanying text, supra.
125. See Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Defi-
nition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Committee].
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lead us to ask the same questions which the transplant committees
asked-when, how, and who determines the moment of death?
First among the committees was the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death
It published its report in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion in the summer of 1968.126 Specific medical criteria for the deter-
mination of a permanently nonfunctioning brain were advanced by the
Committee. These were: 1. Unreceptivity and unresponsivity; 2. No
movements or breathing; 3. No reflexes; and, 4. Flat electroencephalo-
gram.' 27  Other determinents of the absence of cerebral function
would also be acceptable, the Committee said.
The report also contained comment upon the legal definition of
death. The Harvard Committee recognized that the law treats -the
question of death as one of fact to be determined in each particular
case. It also said: 2 '
In this report, however, we suggest that responsible medical
opinion is ready to adopt new criteria for pronouncing death -to
have occurred in an individual sustaining irreversible coma as a
result of permanent brain damage. If this position is adopted by
the medical community, it can form the basis for change in the
current legal concept of death. No statutory change in the 'law
should be necessary since the law treats this question essentially
as one of fact to be determined by physicians. The only circum-
stance in which it would be necessary that legislation be offered
in the various states to define "death" by law would be in the
event that great controversy were engendered surrounding the sub-
ject and physicians were unable to agree on the new medical cri-
teria.
It is recommended as a part of these procedures that judg-
ment of -the existence of these criteria is solely a medical criteria.
Shortly after the Harvard Committee published its report, the
American Medical Association adopted "Guidelines for Organ Trans-
plantation". 29 These Guidelines are intended 'to provide ethical
standards to physicians connected with transplant procedures. Among
the standards contained in the AMA Guidelines are the following:130
1. In all professional relationships between a physician and
his patient, -the physician's primary concern must be the health of
his patient. He owes the patient his primary allegiance. This
126. Id.
127. ld.
128. Id. at 339.
129. Id.; Judicial Council of the AMA, Ethical Guidelines for Organ Transplanta-
tion, 205 J.A.M.A. 89 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Council].
130. Id. at 90.
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concern and -allegiance must be preserved in all medical proce-
dures, including those which involve the -transplantation of an or-
gan from one person -to another where both donor and recipient
are patients. Care must, therefore, be taken to protect the rights
of both the donor and the recipient, and no physician may assume
a responsibility in organ transplantation unless the rights of both
donor and recipient are equally protected.
2. A prospective organ transplant offers no justification for
a relaxation of the usual standard of medical care. The physician
should provide his patient, who may be a prospective organ donor,
with that care usually given others being treated for a similar in-
jury or disease.
3. When a vital, single organ is to be transplanted, the
death of the donor shall have been determined by at least one
physician other than the recipient's physician. Death shall be de-
termined by the clinical judgment of the physician. In making
this determination, the ethical physician will use all available, cur-
rently accepted scientific tests.
The Harvard Committee Report and the AMA Guidelines were
among the first authoritative statements issued regarding human organ
transplantation and death. While both reports recognize the sensitive
and urgent nature of their subject matter, neither of -them advocated
the adoption of statutory definitions of death. The Harvard Commit-
tee Report specifically states that "no statutory change in the law
should be necessary."'' The AMA Guidelines state that the deter-
mination of death should be made using scientific tests.' 32 Neverthe-
less, others have argued that legal tests are necessary.
In 1970, Kansas became the first state to adopt a statutory defini-
tion of death. The enactment of this legislation came in response to
the social and political pressures which were generated by heart trans-
plantation. The Kansas statute specifies alternative definitions of
death; one is associated with absence of the classical vital signs and
the other relates to absence of spontaneous brain functions. Either
definition may be used by the attending physician in Kansas as the
statute does not indicate a preference or order of application. The
Kansas act defines death as follows:"'
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if,
in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medi-
cal practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and
cardiac function and, because of the disease or condition which
caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, attempts at
131. Committee, note 125 supra, at 339.
132. Council, note 129 supra, at 90.
133. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 117-202 (supp. 1971).
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resuscitations are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death
will have occurred at the time these 'functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if,
in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medi-
cal practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain function;
and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice, during reas-
sonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circula-
tory or respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain func-
tion, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive
maintenance will not succeed, death will have occurred at the 'time
when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced
'before artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory
function are terminated and before any vital organ is removed for
purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for
all purposes in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal
cases, and laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
As the first enactement of its kind, the Kansas statute has been
subjected to a great deal of analysis and criticism. Four of the most
frequent criticisms are:
1. It is incorrect, medically, to say that death is two different
conditions. Death is, after all, only one condition that may be charac-
terized in more than one manner.1
3 4
2. The Kansas statute is too specific. It does not permit physi-
cians to exercise medical judgment according to their scientific opinion
of a particular case. It is so inflexible as to be repressive.1 5
3. It is obviously oriented -to facilitating -transplantation proce-
dures, whereas it should have as its primary purpose the protection
of all dying patients, whether they are potential organ donors or not. 136
4. The Kansas law does not address itself to the attending phy-
iscian or physicians. It does not require that more than one physician
make a determination of death in difficult or questionable cases; it
does not ensure that determination of death will be made by at least
a physician other than one involved in caring for an organ recipient. 37
In spite of these and other criticisms, the fact remains that the
134. Address by M. Murphy, Medico-Legal Aspects of Death, Fourth National
Congress in Medical Ethics (AMA), April 26-28, 1973.
135. See Capron and Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determin-
ing Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (1972); Note,
The Criteria for Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants - A Medico-Legal
Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220 (1973).
136. Committee, note 125 supra, at 339; Council note 129 supra, at 90.
137. Id.
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Kansas statute sought to quiet the voices that so loudly cried, "There
oughta be a law!". (Parenthetically, only one other state legislature-
Maryland-has been similarly motivated). 138  Even now, -the cries for
statutory definitions of death persist. Have they found ways to correct
the faults of the Kansas statute? Let us first consider the arguments
made in favor of the statutory definitions of death and then look at
a recent proposal.
The movement for statutory definitions of death persists because
its advocates feel that it is vital for the public to be involved in defin-
ing death.' 39  To be sure, death is a partly religious and philosophical
phenomenon; it is inextricably associated with living and the quality
of life. Death is certainly not only a medical or scientific phenom-
enon. As a matter of extra-medical concern, death is a matter of pub-
lic concern and sometimes confusion. Thus, it is reasoned, as a matter
of public concern, death is a proper matter for public expression.
And, it is urged, the proper forum for public expression concerning
death is a state legislature, and the proper manner in which to voice
public expression is a statute. 4 "
While it is clear that the subject of death is one in which 'the
public has a valid interest, it does not seem so clear that legislative
definitions of death are of much practical value or that they answer
the particular public need. Certainly the definition of death is a mat-
ter of public concern and ought to be discussed; but, will a statute
lessen concern or expedite discussion? The mere passage of a statute
does not, in and of itself, alleviate concern regarding the matter regu-
lated by the law. The passage of a statute also might not promote
free discussion of its subject matter. A statute might tend to inhibit
expression by becoming the object of discussion rather than a vehicle
for it.
Other reasons advanced in support of statutory definitions of
death are that they would help achieve uniformity in the law and also
might reduce malpractice litigation.' It is indeed doubtful that statu-
tory definitions of death will help the law of the several states become
more uniform unless every state legislature adopts precisely the same
statute. No uniformity can be achieved by adoption of a slightly dif-
ferent statute in each state. It is true that courts have disagreed in
138. See ANN. CODE OF MD., ART. 43 § 54F (1972).
139. See Capron and Kass, note 135 supra, at 100-1.
140. Id.
141. ld. at 97-9.
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particular cases regarding definitions of death. But it is difficult to
imagine how legislative disagreement could be better than judicial dis-
agreement. It is also difficult to accept that legislative uniformity
might be achieved more easily than judicial uniformity. Perhaps the
present legal system, wherein the question of death is decided accord-
ing to all of the facts and circumstances of each case, is better than
being bound by fixed legislative standards. Perhaps the best -thing
about the present law is its flexibility to meet the exigencies of each
case it confronts.
The argument that statutory definitions of death would reduce
malpractice litigation is the last one discussed here. The law of mal-
practice is, to a large extent, involved with the concept of negligence.
Medical malpractice is concerned with negligence by physicians' treat-
ing patients. Regardless of whether a statutory or medical standard
is used -to determine the arrival of death, the standard of care with
which a physician must treat his patients does not change. It is impos-
sible for any mere definition of death to either lessen or increase the
responsibility of the physician to care for his patients.
Suffice it to say -that there are those who would disagree with
-this appraisal of the need for statutory definitions of death. They be.
lieve it is necessary and urgent for every state to enact such legislation.
Two of the most vigorous proponents of definition of death legis-
lation have developed a legislative proposal they feel meets the objec-
tions to the Kansas statute. 4 ' They are Alexander M. Capron, a
member of the law faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, and Leon
R. Kass, a physician and doctor of philosophy and Executive Secretary
of the Committee on the Life Sciences and Social Policy of the Na-
'tional Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.' 43 Both
of these 'gentlemen were members of the Task Force on Death and
Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences
(Purely as an aside, one might note that the Task Force concluded
that no statutory change in the law will be necessary if the medical
profession itself adopts the Harvard brain death criteria. 44
The Capron-Kass proposal reads as follows:
A person will be considered dead if in 'the announced opinion
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
142. Id.
143. Id. at 87.
144. Report of the Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society,
Ethics and the Life Sciences, Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death,
221 J.A.M.A. 85, 87 (1968).
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he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous res-
piratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artificial
means of support preclude a determination that these functions
have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the announced
opinion of a physicians, based on ordinary standards of medical
practice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spon-
taneous brain functions. Death will have occurred at the time
when the relevant functions ceased.
145
Although Capron and Kass obviously feel that this language
meets the criticisms aimed at the Kansas, statute, it is possible that it
is too vague to be a significant or substantial variance from current
law. It may not be any improvement at all over what we have now.
While such arguments as these discussed may persuade some that
statutory definitions of death are desirable, they do not include any
evidence that such legislation is necessary. There is no evidence that
physicians are unable to determine whether death has overcome a
given patient, there is no evidence that physicians have killed any
given patient-donor to remove his heart, and there is no evidence that
ethical principles are being violated. How would a statute relieve a
doctor's responsibility? He must still minister to 'his patient, he must
still be the one who first perceives that it is appropriate to raise the
question of whether death has occurred. When should the doctor ask
the question? Would it be preferable to have the physician attending
his patient ask, "What can and should I do next for my patient?" or
"Are the statutory criteria now applicable to my patient?" What is
the difference between a defendant-physician in a malpractice case
showing that he adhered to the normal standards of medical practice
inhis community and his showing that he applied the statute?
Wouldn't he still be liable for a negligent failure to do either? Lastly,
where is the public outcry demanding a more active role in death de-
cision-making? Even if there were such demands, would it then be
plausible -to expect the public to then disregard medical determinations
by physicians? Would dying patients really desire their plight to be-
come a subject of public concern?
Is there, then, sufficient evidence to indicate that a law defining
death is required? Since the beginnings of medical practice doctors
have been treating men's ailments to ward off death. They have been
dealing with it and determining when it has occurred. They have in-
vestigated it and developed ever better methods of staying and per-
ceiving it. They will continue -to do so. Is this or any other the proper
145. Capron and Kass, note 135 supra, at 111.
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moment in the state of -the medical ,art to remove death from the
sphere of medicine? Can or will we accept the responsibility of
changing today's law to accomodate tomorrow's medical advance in
sufficient time to achieve any useful result? There is no reason to
suppose that an affirmative answer to this question is reasonable. 14 6
2. "Dying Patient" Statutes147
We now return to the statutes establishing procedure for allowing
of death to occur, and find yet another problem with definition of
death legislation. Given the definition of death legislation and the re-
quest of a patient that he be permitted to die, hopeless confusion re-
sults. Certainly there is a way to resolve the obvious problems, but
this would no doubt take the form of additional legislation attempting
to include all of the variations possible. Perhaps the problems could
be resolved, and if not the courts could intercede to decide. We re-
turn to minutia, nothing has been resolved, morality prevails.
As for the "dying patient" statutes, what would be accomplished?
By persisting in referring to euthanasia, the necessary inference ac-
companies the reference that because we speak of euthanasia it is
something to be condemned unless it is controlled by law. Therefore,
we need the proffered legislation. However we have such condemna-
tory legislation. It is the universally adopted law that penalizes mur-
der.
But, it is argued, there is a need to go beyond the criminal law
and statutorily regulate the circumstances in which the dying patient
should be permitted to expire. Perhaps if we do not adopt such leg-
islation those poor, suffering people for whom death is a certainty
would not otherwise die. Simply because the proposed legislation
speaks only to the situation in which death is imminent and inevitable
it is patently ridiculous. What is sought to be controlled by law is
nothing more than the natural termination of life. This is not only
an incredibly unbelieveable posture for a statute to assume, it is arro-
146. Thus, we return to a definition of death that is simply the termination of or
departure from life. Halley and Harvey, Medical vs. Legal Definitions of Death, 204
J.A.M.A. 103, 104 (1968). For authorities opposing proposed definition of death stat-
utes, see Murphy, note 134 supra; Bergen, Death, Definition and Diagnosis, 209 J.A.M.A.
1759 (1969): Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death - An Appraisal, 285 N. ENGL.
J. MED. 946 (1971). The AMA recently adopted a position opposing such statutes,
and requesting members to make this view known. Report, Death, Judicial Council
Report A, American Medical Association, adopted Dec. 5, 1973.
147. This, of course, is the subject most often discussed. See notes 18-101 and
accompanying text, supra.
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gant and unnecessary. Possibly the next item on the legislative
agenda should be legal recognition of the right to wake up at the term-
ination of sleep.
The right to life includes -the right to experience its natural term-
ination. This is a part of life that occurs around us every day. It
is being handled and recognized by all of us, each in his own manner.
Must we now invade that most private and mysterious fate that awaits
us with a law -that would deny us the intimacy and urgency of life's
last moments? Such law would change nothing but the dignity of
meeting the end surrounded by the values it has taken us that lifetime
to develop.
3. The Right to Refuse Life-Supporting Medical Treatment
It is said that from the moment of birth we begin -the process
of dying. Throughout this discussion I have attempted to use the
words "imminent and inevitable" in referring to the matter at hand.
This terminology helped confine this discussion to one class of dying
persons, a class which all too often has been called simply "dying pa-
tient".
At any time during our lives when we become afflicated with an
ailment that could cause death and when we receive the attention of
a physician because of that ailment, we are "dying patients". Death
might even be "imminent" for some of us, and it might be "inevitable"
for others. And, when it becomes both imminent and inevitable we
acquire the right to experience it. But what of the patient for whom
it is only imminent? Does he have any correlary right to die?
The law has addressed itself to this question and the commenta-
tors are urged that there is such a right.11 8  They also observe that
it is a right which is subject to legal restriction. Since death is these
cases is not inevitable, the necessary condition imposed on the right
to die is that the patient should be compelled to live if his death would
produce undesirable effects upon society.1 9  Thus, for example,
148. There is absolutely nothing wrong with allowing morality to determine the
conduct of our society so long as that conduct is well-founded and universal. The fact
of the matter is that oftentimes a law is just not required. See Holman, The Time Lag
between Medicine and Law, 9 LEX ET SCIENTIA 102, 106-8 (1972) (citing cases in
which the courts expressed substantially the same view).
149. See Sullivan, The Dying Person - His Plight and His Right, 8 N. ENGL. L.
REV. 197 (1973); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Constitutional Guaran-
tees: A Conflict? 33 PITT. L. REV. 628 (1972); Note, The Right To Die, 7 HousT.
L. REV. 654 (1970); Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment, 7 J. FAM. L. 644 (1968).
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where the dying patient would -seek to refuse life-saving medications
but whose death would work an unreasonable hardship upon his fam-
ily, the government has a valid interest in denying the right to die. 150
Let us not confuse such cases with the plight of the dying patient
for whom death is both imminent and inevitable. Let us not use them
as support for legislation regarding something else. Let us consider
the question of statutory regulation of death according to the precise
nature of the proper subject matter, and let the law intercede only
where morality and ethics will not suffice.
CONCLUSION
The "euthanasia controversy" is more one of semantics than of
substance. As it is now constituted, the controversy does not exist.
But, there is a substantial problem looming on the horizon, one which
must be addressed, considered and, if necessary, acted upon.
In continuing to look at death as an entity unto itself, the ques-
tion of who should die can arise. By asking this question we begin
-to consider the possibilities-the strong and healthy should live, -and
the weak and timid should die; the intelligent should live, and the un-
intelligent should die. Thus we fall into the trap that those who would
have us extinguish the "defective" would set for us. This cannot be
permitted to happen.
Rather than viewing death as a separate function, we must in-
clude it in our total concept of life. The issue must be whether we
can do anything about improving life, not whether we can facilitate
death. Our attention must be focused on life, and our efforts must
be toward improving it. Our compassion and human understanding
should guide our steps toward the goal of life with dignity not death
with dignity for each individual. The morality of mankind would not
have it otherwise.
150. See id.
